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I. INTRODUCTION
From Chance to Choice: Genetics and Justice1 is a well-written and
tightly argued analysis. This Essay addresses two topics meriting more
attention than they received from these authors. First, this Essay
considers in greater detail a topic the book briefly addresses—the human
research necessary to support clinical use of genetic interventions. What
appears as simply a step along the way to clinical benefits may actually
present serious impediments. Second, this Essay expands on a point the
authors mentioned only in passing. They noted that developments in
* Daniel Noyes Kirby Professor of Law, Professor of Ethics in Medicine,
Washington University, St. Louis. Thanks to Jeremy Sugarman and Eric Juengst for their
help on an earlier draft.
1. ALLEN BUCHANAN ET AL., FROM CHANCE TO CHOICE: GENETICS AND JUSTICE 23
(2000).
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genetics are blurring traditional species boundaries. Blurred boundaries
between humans and other species raise questions about our moral
obligations in applying genetic interventions.
II. HUMAN STUDIES ISSUES
The authors frequently observed that many predictions about possible
benefits from the new molecular genetics could prove incorrect.
Nevertheless, they took the risk of overestimating what genetic
interventions will achieve in order to “provide guidance for significant
choices that our society may well have to make in the future.”2
Accordingly, they discussed justice in a world in which genetic
interventions, including germ line interventions in human embryos,
provide valuable benefits to members of society.
For the most part, this Essay supports the authors’ efforts to anticipate
the ethical implications of potential genetic knowledge and technology.
We will need many years of analysis and debate to delineate defensible
policies and practices for the future. On the other hand, it seems
important to give due regard to the ethical issues that will arise along the
way. Human research is one precondition to clinical performance of
selective, rapid, and accurate direct genetic interventions in gametes or
embryos. The authors perhaps underestimated the scientific, ethical, and
practical impediments to conducting such research.
Elliott Sober’s appendix on genetic causation sheds light on the
complexity of the research task. Sober noted various difficulties and
uncertainties in determining the relative contributions of genes and
environment to human traits. He described data from plant experiments
showing that gene and environment interactions can be complex and that
“genes make a difference in some contexts and not in others, and that the
same is true of the environment.”3 Because “ethics prevents us from
cloning human beings and rearing them in identical environments,”4 we
must rely on quantitative genetics to estimate the relative contributions
of genes and environment to various traits of interest. Molecular
techniques can provide information about which genes affect various
traits, but again, the effect of a specific gene on a trait can be
environmentally mediated in complex ways. Having a gene associated
with a condition is not sufficient to produce the condition.
Before genetic interventions in human embryos can proceed in the
clinical setting, research findings must show that such interventions are
2. Id.
3. Elliot Sober, The Meaning of Genetic Causation, in BUCHANAN ET AL., supra
note 1, at 360 app.1.
4. Id. at 363.
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safe and effective ways of producing benefits to children. Research
findings must also show that the interventions are equivalent to or better
than other available interventions in producing such benefits. If a health
problem or other disfavored condition can be addressed more effectively
and safely by alternative means, genetic interventions should not be
performed. What procedures and data will be necessary to demonstrate
the relative safety and efficacy of genetic interventions in human embryos?
The process of establishing safety and efficacy will be intricate. First,
a gene or group of genes must be determined to be a substantial cause
(how substantial?) of the trait of interest. Second, scientists must
develop safe and accurate methods to test embryos for the relevant genes
and to replace those genes with ones believed likely (how likely?) to
produce the desired change. Third, the children receiving the replaced
genes must be observed over time to assess the positive and negative
effects of the replacement. Sober’s analysis suggested that researchers
should observe children raised in different common environments, for
effects could differ depending on factors such as diet, living conditions,
climate, parental attitudes, and so forth. Fourth, the technique must be
compared to other possible methods of achieving the desired change.
In this context, scientists will be studying not corn plants, but people.
Can valid, ethical studies of this sort be conducted? The authors of
From Chance to Choice: Genetics and Justice acknowledged some of
the complexities, uncertainties, and risks presented by research on germ
line interventions in humans. They concluded, however, that research
should proceed, with “careful scrutiny of any protocols for experiments
involving these interventions.”5 It is possible, they wrote, that scientists
will develop the means to perform precise genetic repairs, reduce germ
line intervention risks to acceptable levels, and produce valuable
treatment or enhancement benefits. Because “we cannot place much
weight on predictions that particular technical problems will be
intractable . . . taking a long-term view of the prospects of genetic
intervention seems a reasonable flirtation with the future.”6 The authors
stressed the need for careful scrutiny of studies proposed and conducted
to determine whether the potential benefits of genetic interventions
outweigh the risks to children and those in later generations that might
be affected. Yet they did not explore in detail either the research
5.
6.

BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 194.
Id.
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necessary to supply such information or the ethical considerations
relevant to reviewing such research.
The first phase of human research is primarily designed to
investigate an experimental intervention’s safety. Though animal and
other preclinical studies can shed light on human risks, they cannot fully
predict the human response. The more limited the safety information
that can be gleaned from alternatives to human studies, the greater the
risk inherent in initial human testing. Germ line genetic interventions in
human embryos will be most defensible when there is strong preclinical
evidence of safety for the human subject of the intervention, as well as
for that subject’s offspring. Support for human testing will also be
strongest for interventions directed at life-threatening conditions that
cannot be treated in any other way.7 The less serious the condition and
the more options already available to treat it, the more difficult it will be
to justify initial human testing.
A related matter concerns the standard of safety that must be met
before further research would be justified. Daniel Koshland suggested that
adequate safety would exist if a germ line genetic intervention were
shown to be “no more risky than the normal process of birth and
conception” and if the “children . . . turn[ed] out to be at least as good as
their parents.”8 These two phrases describe different standards—one
could be assessed at birth; the other would require long-term assessment.
Moreover, greater detail is needed regarding how the standards could be
put into practice.
Observing a germ line intervention’s effect on the embryo and fetus
can provide only limited data.9 Accordingly, the resulting children must
be observed as well. How many children would be an adequate sample
for safety testing? How long should they be followed? Must their
offspring be followed as well? And what will researchers look for?
Paul Billings noted that safety evaluators will need methods to assess
“non-gross changes in complex system development (mental, for
example) or the late-life results of inflammatory or degenerative
complications arising from a genetic intervention.”10 It will be particularly
difficult to assess the safety of interventions designed to address
7. Jeremy Sugarman, Ethical Considerations in Leaping from Bench to Bedside,
285 SCIENCE 2071, 2071 (1999).
8. Daniel Koshland, Jr., Ethics and Safety, in ENGINEERING THE HUMAN
GERMLINE 25, 26 (Gregory Stock & John Campbell eds., 2000).
9. See W. French Anderson, A New Front in the Battle Against Disease, in
ENGINEERING THE HUMAN GERMLINE, supra note 8, at 43, 47 (stating that currently only
“gross defect or death” can be assessed in a human zygote injected with an exogenous
gene).
10. Paul Billings, In Utero Gene Therapy: The Case Against, 5 NATURE MED. 255,
255 (1999).
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polygenic traits. Because different genes interact differently with each
other and the environment, each new genetic intervention will need to
undergo in-depth assessment to determine its potential negative effects.
Will prospective parents volunteer themselves and their children for
such studies? It is hard to imagine that many will. The most likely
candidates are those whose children are at risk for the most devastating
conditions—conditions resulting in early death or severe disability.
From among that group, candidates for enrollment will be people who
reject childlessness and the variety of alternative ways to have healthy
children, including preimplantation genetic diagnosis,11 other forms of
prenatal diagnosis, donor gametes, and adoption.12 They will also be
people with such strong desires to avoid a particular genetic risk to their
children that they are willing to undergo an unproven intervention
presenting unknown risks to humans, risks likely to include premature
death and serious disability. They will be individuals willing to accept
responsibilities for cooperating with long-term follow-up for their
children—children who could resist such measures as they grow older.13
These risks, burdens, and unknowns seem to diminish the probability
that adequately informed people will sign up for safety testing of
interventions to address conditions other than those highly associated
with early death or an extremely reduced quality of life. It is difficult to
believe that many individuals whose children face less serious threats
would find early phase testing an appealing choice. Thus, human testing
of genetic interventions to prevent common illnesses such as cancer and
heart disease and to enhance positively-viewed traits should have a
tough time getting off the ground.
11. In this procedure, embryos created through in vitro fertilization are tested for
genetic mutations. Embryos that do not have mutations are implanted in the uterus and
the others are discarded. See Jeffrey R. Botkin, Ethical Issues and Practical Problems in
Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis, 26 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 17, 17 (1998).
12. See generally MARK S. FRANKEL & AUDREY R. CHAPMAN, HUMAN
INHERITABLE GENETIC MODIFICATIONS: ASSESSING SCIENTIFIC, ETHICAL, RELIGIOUS, AND
POLICY ISSUES (2000), available at http://www.aaas.org/spp/dspp/sfrl/germline/main.htm
(last visited June 23, 2002) (assessing the prospects for creating genetic change in
humans and exploring the ethical, religious, and social implications). One might assume
that many candidates would be opposed to prenatal diagnosis because they believe it is
wrong to discard embryos and terminate pregnancies. Yet people participating in germ
line studies will not necessarily avoid such practices. Attempts to modify the germ line
“will still require prenatal diagnosis with the prospect of selective abortion to prevent the
birth of seriously impaired children.” Id. at 14.
13. See Gwen Moulton, Panel Finds In Utero Gene Therapy Proposal Is
Premature, 91 J. NAT’L. CANCER INST. 407, 408 (1999).
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Later phase human testing presents further problems. Here, researchers
will be collecting data on efficacy as well as safety. The randomized
clinical trial (RCT) is the gold standard for determining when research
Because of the
interventions should enter the clinical arena.14
environmental and other nongenetic influences on most genetic
conditions, RCTs will often be needed to evaluate whether particular
genetic interventions are effective in reducing the undesired trait’s
incidence. Moreover, because observational biases could influence
results in many cases, blinding of participants and investigators will
often be desirable. The standard RCT approach also would support
comparing the group receiving the genetic intervention to a placebo
group when there is no available alternative intervention or the available
alternative is of questionable efficacy.
Consider the requirements of a classic RCT in the context of
evaluating genetic interventions in human embryos. Prospective parents
would be asked to enroll in a study requiring them to undergo in vitro
fertilization and other procedures involved in embryo intervention
without assurance that their children would receive the modification. If
a placebo group were included, they would have to agree to the
possibility that no actual intervention would be performed. Whenever
parental expectations could influence study results, parents would have
to agree to remain blinded for the period necessary to perform an
adequate evaluation. If this were a lengthy period, the group assignment
would have to be kept from the children as well.
Again, it is doubtful that many parents will be willing to enroll
themselves and their children in such trials. Only those seeking to avoid
the most severe disorders are likely to accept the conditions and
uncertainties of participating in classic RCTs. Perhaps researchers will
devise methods to evaluate genetic interventions that impose fewer
constraints on parents and children. But scientifically rigorous data on
potential harms and benefits is a moral and regulatory prerequisite to
approving genetic interventions for clinical use.
Germ line genetic interventions present numerous research ethics
issues that will not be easily resolved. One set of issues concerns the
appropriate authority of parents to bind children to future long-term
follow-up measures. Another concerns the reproductive freedom of
individuals whose altered germ lines are later determined to present
threats to future generations. Many issues will arise in establishing
acceptable risk-expected benefit ratios for proposals to test germ line
interventions in humans. A major question is whether a defensible
14. See ROBERT J. LEVINE, ETHICS AND REGULATION OF CLINICAL RESEARCH 185–
212 (2d ed. 1986).
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approach to assessing risk to future generations can be developed.
Other questions concern the appropriate outcome measures for germ
line interventions. Would the finding of interest be absence of the
undesired genes in the child or absence of the undesired symptoms or
characteristics? Would the intervention’s effect be measured according
to the child’s functional abilities, subjective well-being, success in life
activities, or economic productivity, as compared to children in control
groups? As researchers move away from interventions to prevent early
death and extreme impairment, it will become more difficult to
formulate and measure desirable outcomes of genetic interventions.
In sum, scientists and ethicists contemplating the potential benefits
offered by germ line interventions should give more thought to the
design and ethics of research on safety and efficacy in humans.
“Leaping from bench to bedside”15 may be more problematic than has
generally been assumed. Will it be possible to conduct the research that
will provide an adequate knowledge base for offering germ line
interventions in the medical setting? Will it be possible to enroll and
retain a sufficient number of participants to collect the necessary data?
Will it be possible to collect such data consistent with requirements that
participants (including offspring once they become adults) give informed
and voluntary consent to research procedures? Only by addressing these
and other research questions can we determine whether, and if so, how,
speculative benefits from germ line genetic interventions will materialize in
the clinical setting.
III. A BROADER PERSPECTIVE ON DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE
In From Chance to Choice: Genetics and Justice, the authors were
most interested in exploring a “set of distributive justice issues raised by
rapid advances in genetic science that have not yet even been
systematically articulated, much less resolved.”16 Rather than addressing
“old questions in new guises,” they confronted “the broader implications
of the possibility of identity-altering interventions for theorizing about
justice.”17
The authors left out at least one broad implication of these
interventions, however. They observed that “[t]he basic techniques of
15.
16.
17.

Sugarman, supra note 7, at 2071.
BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 62–63.
Id. at 62.
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manipulating DNA render the so-called barriers between species
breachable,” making “the very idea of a species . . . less important.”18
They discussed traditional assumptions that moral theory must be
based on human nature, and noted that our conception of justice could
be altered if genetic knowledge and technology give us the power to
alter human nature. They wrote: “[I]f we come to regard the constraints
of our ‘nature’ as rather negligible, as our ability to change ourselves
increases, we may then focus directly on what sorts of characteristics
we want our lives and the lives of our offspring to have, whether they
are human lives or not.”19 They also commented that heightened
“[a]ppreciation for the fungibility of DNA, the consequent malleability
of life, and the permeability of so-called species barriers . . . may add
impetus to the efforts of animal rights activists to rid our moral
theorizing of parochialism.”20
The remainder of the book considers justice toward humans, arguing
that “a just health care system should strive to remove barriers to
opportunity that are due to disease,”21 and discusses when “genetic
interventions may be required to counteract the opportunity-limiting
effects of natural inequalities that do not constitute diseases.”22 The
authors seemed to assume that any such justice-based obligations apply
only to those traditionally labeled human. Yet the blurring of species
boundaries made possible through new genetic knowledge could alter
conventional ideas about who belongs to “the primary moral community.”23
Recent activities in genetics research emphasize the substantial natural
genetic similarities among mammalian and even nonmammalian species.
Roundworm, fruit fly, and mouse genomes are being sequenced in part
because this will provide information on biologic processes occurring in
humans. Current technology enables researchers to transfer human genes to
other species, creating transgenic animals. Thus far, such transfers have
been limited to small amounts of genetic material, keeping traditional
species labels intact. Yet transfers of more extensive amounts of genetic
material may become feasible. It also may become possible to enhance
the cognitive abilities of other species through genetic interventions.24
Imagine that scientists locate a group of human genes strongly
associated with memory. They transfer those genes to chimpanzee and
18. Id. at 87.
19. Id. at 93.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 16.
22. Id. at 96.
23. Id. at 258.
24. See Nicholas Wade, Smarter Mouse Is Created in Hope of Helping People,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 1999, at A1.
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gorilla embryos, and find the animals’ memory and general intelligence
are significantly enhanced. What moral issues would be raised by this
research?
First, note that this alteration would only increase the substantial
natural DNA similarities between humans and the great apes. It would
also only improve the relatively high cognitive capacities that chimpanzees
and gorillas possess naturally. The great apes’ natural abilities underlie
current efforts to grant them heightened moral and legal protection.25
The transgenic creatures would simply resemble humans even more in
their genetic and behavioral characteristics.
The ability to create enhanced great apes would present numerous
ethical and policy questions. I focus on a few that are relevant to the
analysis in From Chance to Choice: Genetics and Justice. The authors
addressed justice in distributing genetic interventions to cure or prevent
disease, which is defined as “adverse departures from normal species
functioning.”26 If genetic interventions render species boundaries less
important and more permeable, what happens to this definition of
disease? What is normal species functioning for the transgenic creatures
described above? How would a theory of the morality of inclusion apply
to the transgenic primates? At what point would they be close enough to
humans to be granted equal moral respect and to possess the same
justice-based claims to special interventions and resources possessed by
people with disabilities? It seems to me that the From Chance to
Choice: Genetics and Justice authors need to address these implications
of blurred species boundaries “to rid [their own] moral theorizing of
parochialism.” 27
IV. CONCLUSION
Before we reach questions of distributive justice and reproductive
autonomy in the use of germ line alterations in human embryos, we will
face questions of how to conduct scientifically valid, ethical research on
these interventions. Gene transfers between humans and other species
could make it more difficult to defend traditional stark distinctions
between moral obligations owed to humans and to other animals and could
25. Allan Coukell, New Zealanders Press Plan for Apes’ Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
16, 1999, at F3.
26. BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 16.
27. Id. at 93.
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complicate the task of achieving justice in the use of genetic knowledge and
interventions. Inquiries into the ethics of genetic intervention should add
clinical research and blurred species boundaries to the list of topics that
merit careful ethical analysis.
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